Key Points

• Marijuana use alone is not enough to lose your gun rights. In United States v. Hemani, the U.S. Supreme Court held 7–2 that the federal government cannot prosecute someone for possessing a firearm based solely on regular marijuana use without an individualized showing of dangerousness or incapacity.
• The Court rejected the government's historical justifications for automatic disarmament. The majority found that historical "habitual drunkard" laws targeted people who were practically incapacitated — not anyone who regularly uses a controlled substance.
• The decision is narrow but carries broad implications for cannabis users and the firearms industry. While the Court left open whether prosecutions backed by individualized proof of dangerousness remain permissible, the ruling is immediately significant for Americans in the 40-plus states with some form of legal marijuana who have faced automatic federal firearm restrictions.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled the federal government cannot prosecute an individual for illegally possessing firearms based solely on admitted regular use of marijuana without any showing of dangerousness or incapacity.

The decision came June 18, 2026, in United States v. Hemani, which focused on the prosecution of an individual under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3). Justice Neil Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a seven-Justice majority, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Sonia Sotomayor, Brett Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion arguing that § 922(g)(3) appears to exceed Congress’ enumerated power under the Commerce Clause. Justice Jackson filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sotomayor, criticizing the framework while joining the majority’s application of it. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Kagan, concurred in the judgment only, writing that he would affirm on the narrower ground that the government’s historical analogues do not support disarmament of an occasional marijuana user like Hemani.

Background

Ali Hemani is a dual citizen of the United States and Pakistan who was born and raised in Texas. In 2022, the government searched the family home based on suspected terrorism-related activities. The Court described Hemani as cooperative throughout the process, describing how he “surrendered a gun he kept in the house and pointed agents to some marijuana on the property. He also consented to an interview, telling law enforcement agents that he used marijuana ‘about every other day.’”

More than six months after the search, the government brought a single-charge indictment against Hemani. Critically, “[t]he charge had nothing to do with terrorism — the reason for the search in the first place. Nor did the charge involve possession of cocaine, drug trafficking, or anything like that.” Instead, “relying solely on his admitted use of marijuana about every other day, the government prosecuted Mr. Hemani for knowingly possessing a gun in his home while being an ‘unlawful user’ of a controlled substance.” For that, Hemani faced up to 15 years in prison under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(8) and lifetime disarmament under § 922(g)(1).

The Government’s Argument

The government conceded that § 922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision “burdens conduct presumptively protected by the Second Amendment” because it “bans a class of people including Mr. Hemani from possessing essentially any firearm for any purpose.” The government acknowledged its burden to show that the regulation is “consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.”

To carry its burden, the government analogized § 922(g)(3) to historical “habitual drunkard” laws, which it argued “enjoy deep roots in the country’s history and are ‘relevantly similar’ to the regulation it wishes to enforce.” These historical laws were sorted by the Court into three general categories: (1) vagrancy laws, under which vagrants — a group that sometimes included habitual drunkards — could be “confine[d] in a workhouse” or “jail[ed],” (2) civil-commitment statutes, under which States “allowed courts to appoint guardians for various individuals, including habitual drunkards, or authorized their ‘commit[ment] to asylums,’” and (3) surety laws, under which “judicial officers . . . could compel habitual drunkards and others to post surety bonds to ensure their good behavior.”

The government argued these laws mirrored § 922(g)(3) in three respects. First, historical laws targeted habitual drunkards for the same reason § 922(g)(3) targets unlawful users — because both groups “regularly use intoxicants.” Second, habitual drunkard laws, like § 922(g)(3), restricted liberties to protect the public from “‘unusually dangerous’ individuals who commit ‘violent crime[s].’” Third, the historical laws “operated in practice much like § 922(g)(3) works — the former allowed governments to detain people in places where they could not bear arms while § 922(g)(3) temporarily disarms unlawful users.”

The Court’s Decision

Justice Gorsuch held that the government’s prosecution of Hemani under § 922(g)(3)’s unlawful user provision is inconsistent with the Second Amendment. Applying previously adopted frameworks, the Court examined whether the government’s historical analogues were “relevantly similar” to § 922(g)(3) in both purpose (“why”) and operation (“how”).

The Court found the government’s analogy failed on every metric:

Different kinds of people targeted. The Court found the government’s first comparison — that historical laws targeted habitual drunkards for the same reason § 922(g)(3) targets unlawful users — “difficult to square with the historical record.” Historical habitual drunkard laws targeted those whose drinking “rendered them practically incapacitated and incapable of managing their affairs.” By contrast, § 922(g)(3) as construed by the government automatically disarms anyone who regularly uses any amount of any controlled substance without requiring any showing of incapacity or dangerousness. The Court used Hemani’s case to illustrate the disconnect, asking: “But how much marijuana does Mr. Hemani use, in what potency, and to what effect? Is he routinely unable to manage his affairs, a risk to himself or his family? Or does he use a mild gummy as a sleep aid a few times a week? We do not know and, the government says, it doesn’t matter.” The Court further illustrated this point by noting that the government’s theory would extend equally to “a husband who regularly takes his wife’s prescription Ambien to sleep and a college student who routinely uses a friend’s Adderall to cram for exams.”

Different purposes. The Court next rejected the government’s claim that § 922(g)(3) disarms unlawful drug users to protect the public from “‘unusually dangerous’ individuals who will ‘misuse . . . firearms’ to commit ‘violent crime[s].’” Vagrancy laws targeted those who “did not meet the societal expectation of work” and sought to promote productivity — not to protect against dangerous persons. Civil-commitment laws sought to protect habitual drunkards from themselves and their families from financial devastation. Surety-of-good-behavior laws sought to protect the community from scandals “against good morals,” not from violence.

Different operation. Turning to the “how,” the Court invoked its previous instruction that “‘[e]ven when a law regulates arms-bearing for a permissible reason,’ . . . ‘it may not be compatible with the [Second Amendment] if it does so to an extent beyond what was done at the founding.’“ Historical laws generally provided some form of pre-deprivation process — a conviction, proceedings before a probate court, or a hearing before a justice of the peace — before any liberty was curtailed. Section 922(g)(3), by contrast, automatically divests an individual of his constitutional right to bear arms the moment he becomes an unlawful user, without any pre-deprivation process.

Doubtful statutory purpose. Finally, the Court expressed skepticism that § 922(g)(3) even serves its claimed purpose of disarming categorically dangerous persons, noting the statute’s reliance on the Controlled Substances Act, a law adopted to protect “the health and general welfare of the American people” rather than to identify violent individuals. The Court highlighted the government’s own inconsistent regulatory actions: the DOJ’s directive curtailing enforcement against marijuana users, the legalization of marijuana to some degree in 40 states and the District of Columbia, and the recent rescheduling of some marijuana products from Schedule I to Schedule III. The Court emphasized that affording the government “broad power to designate any group as dangerous and thereby disqualify its members from having a gun” would risk allowing it to “quickly swallow” the Second Amendment.

Scope and Limitations of the Decision

The Court was careful to characterize its decision as narrow, expressly not addressing:

• Efforts to ban addicts or those presently intoxicated from possessing firearms.
• Other prophylactic laws Congress might adopt after determining that users of a particular drug pose a special risk of misusing firearms.
• Section 922(g)(1)’s provision disarming individuals convicted of felonies.
• Whether the government could bring a prosecution under § 922(g)(3) accompanied by individualized proof that the defendant’s drug use renders him a danger to himself or others, or proof that a certain drug always renders its users dangerous.

Implications

For marijuana users and firearms owners. The decision means the federal government cannot, under the theory advanced in this case, automatically prosecute individuals under § 922(g)(3) solely for possessing a firearm while being a regular marijuana user, without some further showing of dangerousness or incapacity. This may have significance for Americans who use marijuana in states where it is legal under state law but who have been subject to federal firearm restrictions. However, the Court expressly reserved the question whether the government could bring a prosecution accompanied by “individualized proof that the defendant’s drug use renders him a danger to himself or others.”

For federal enforcement policy. The decision will likely further curtail federal enforcement of § 922(g)(3) against marijuana users under the automatic-disarmament theory rejected by the Court, though it leaves open the possibility of prosecutions accompanied by individualized proof of dangerousness. The Court’s analysis focused specifically on marijuana, emphasizing the government’s own inconsistent regulatory actions with respect to that drug—in questioning whether § 922(g)(3) serves its claimed purpose. Whether and how the decision’s reasoning might apply to users of other controlled substances remains to be seen.

For the cannabis industry. Cannabis businesses operating lawfully under state law—including dispensary employees and security personnel—may find the decision relevant to arguments against automatic federal firearm disqualification, though the full scope will depend on how lower courts apply the decision’s limiting principles and whether the government pursues individualized-proof prosecutions in particular cases.

What remains open. The Court expressly reserved questions about the constitutionality of disarming drug addicts, presently intoxicated persons, convicted felons under § 922(g)(1), and persons for whom individualized proof of dangerousness exists. These issues will likely generate further litigation in the lower courts.

For more information, please contact Akshay Krishnamani at 312.276.1328 or akrishnamani@foxrothschild.com, Andrew M. Halbert at 312.517.9204 or ahalbert@foxrothschild.com, or another member of Fox Rothschild’s national Cannabis Law Practice Group.

This information is intended to inform firm clients and friends about legal developments, including the decisions of courts and administrative bodies. Nothing in this alert should be construed as legal advice or a legal opinion. Readers should not act upon the information contained in this alert without seeking the advice of legal counsel. Views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily this law firm or its clients.